point of this chapter, Muslim. Although most Europeans still deny that Muslim anti-Semitism is growing, the reality is that “the communities most resentful of Israel in Europe are Muslim. The perpetrators of anti-Semitic incidents in France are not right-wing extremists protecting the ‘French race’ from Jewish contamination: The 400 or so anti-Semitic incidents documented in the country during 2001 have mostly been attributed to Muslim youth of North African origin.”9 It should also be pointed out that in Europe anti-Semitism is strongly reinforced by widespread anti-Americanism.

Whether explicitly or not, at least in part due to the influence of their own growing Muslim populations, most European governments have generally adopted foreign policies friendly to the Palestinians, and the EU has been the largest donor to the Palestinian Authority. Whether that will continue after the violent anti-Danish and anti-French demonstrations in Gaza in February 2006 remains to be seen.

It increasingly appears that Europe, like the United States, is reassessing its approach to immigration, moving from openness and tolerance to growing controls. It also appears that, unlike the United States, and beginning with the most tolerant countries (Netherlands, Denmark), there is growing anxiety in Europe regarding the immigrant Muslim population’s interest or ability to integrate.

A Sea Change in the Atlantic Economy?
How the West Pulled Ahead of the Rest
and Why It May Cease to Do So

Stephen A. Schuker


A decade later, the pendulum has swung the other way. A serious breach in the alliance has opened. Continental opinion has turned as


1. Hansard, House of Commons, 3rd. series, vol. 97, column 122, March 1, 1848; also David Brown, Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy, 82–83.

2. Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance.

harshly against the United States as it did at the time of the Vietnam War or during the later controversy over installation of the Pershing II missiles. In 2002 France and Germany refused to countenance meaningful sanctions against Iraq in the United Nations; in 2003 they vociferously opposed American military action against the Iraqi regime. And when hostilities ended they declined to participate meaningfully in rebuilding that country. Of the larger West European countries, only Great Britain unreservedly supported the United States. The Spanish and Italian governments, which at first sent modest contingents, found themselves compelled by public opinion to reverse course. By 2005 the German authorities were releasing some purported terrorists for lack of evidence and granting early parole to others. The Italian authorities, meanwhile, had issued arrest warrants for CIA operatives. Europeans complained that the United States had moved the goalposts in the original war against terror. The American authorities considered the West Europeans preternaturally craven, even in such matters of presumed common interest as stopping Iran from building nuclear weapons. In early 2006, when Iran removed the seals from its uranium enrichment facilities and booted out inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, West European foreign ministers reacted ineffectually and referred the matter to the United Nations. Were these mere epiphenomena, or auguries of a problematic future? Political scientists build predictive models on the basis of evidence at hand. Extrapolation from present events constitutes their stock and trade. Hence, many ascribe fundamental importance to the disputes of the past few years. Elizabeth Pond speaks of the “decay and threatened dissolution of the West.” Turning Churchill’s famous aphorism on its head, she warns that the hope of the world lies not only in the strength and will of the United States, but “in its good judgment as well.” In her interpretation, a “pox Americana” has needlessly offended Europeans of goodwill.


5. Elizabeth Pond, Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance.

Robert Kagan has dined out in influential circles propounding an alternate conception of inevitable estrangement. As he elucidates the respective approaches on the two sides of the Atlantic, American elites—and specifically the leading actors in the George W. Bush administration—conceive of the world as a brutish Hobbesian environment. In the final analysis, the Americans hold, they must resort to force in order to maintain stability, defend national interests, advance human rights when feasible, and curb rogue states bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The American taxpayer must dig deep into his pockets in order to maintain a force structure that can achieve those goals. In practice, this translates into spending as much on the armed forces as the next fourteen nations combined. By contrast, the West Europeans, or at any rate the governments of “old Europe,” endeavor to make progress toward a Kantian-style perpetual peace by fostering a network of institutions for multilateral problem solving. Having luxuriated under the American military umbrella for more than half a century, West Europeans are captivated by the notion of security on the cheap. They want so far as possible to refer extra-European conflicts to the United Nations Security Council, to elaborate an independent foreign policy and defense mechanism within the European Union, and to win acceptance for an international criminal court claiming universal jurisdiction.

It occasions no surprise that different ways of looking at the world should emerge, even among those sharing broadly congruent values, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Just a decade ago, fashionable pundits professed to believe that the disappearance of the Soviet danger would usher in a brave new world without great-power conflict. Analysts of the realist school have always considered that notion a self-indulgent fantasy. Absent ideological or existential menace, realists expect medium-level powers to balance against a hegemon and

6. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, characteristically titled in translation, L’Europe face au nouvel ordre américain. I focus here on Pond and Kagan because their works function as synecdoches for larger schools of academic thought. Punditry on the subject of American-European relations has turned into a growth industry with low barriers to entry. Among recent works that have sparked extensive commentary in the mass media, two stand out. Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West, holds out measured hope for reconciliation; Bernard Henri Lévy, AmericanVertigo: Traveling America in the Footsteps of Tocqueville, raises the question, “Has America gone mad?”

smaller countries to draw what advantages they can as free riders in the system.8

The Bush administration’s determination to act preemptively, and when necessary unilaterally, against terrorist perils constitutes no radical departure in American foreign policy. Washington has acted preemptively and unilaterally on earlier occasions when a perceived threat to the national interest arose.9 Likewise, the administration’s rhetorical emphasis on the propagation of core democratic beliefs—principles of liberty and justice that are “right and true for all people everywhere”—is not new. It falls within a framework of thought going back to Puritan New England. James Kurth has labeled such crusading democracy the “Protestant deformation”—a proselytizing form of individualism shorn of its religious base. In the Third World, Kurth suggests, that peculiarly American ideology exerts a destabilizing effect because it undermines hierarchy and community.10 In any event, this latest iteration of neo-Wilsonian idealism makes most Europeans in their present temper squirm. The National Security strategy paper published in 2002 turned the notion of balance of power on its head. Through its willingness to use force, that document proclaimed with almost Wilhelminian hubris, “the United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom.”11

Perhaps, as a number of critics argue, the robust tone of American foreign policy during the Bush era paid insufficient homage to the importance of “soft power.” That wily Habsburg reactionary, Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg, remarked after his victory over the 1848 revolutionaries that “one can do an awful lot with bayonets, but one can’t sit on them.”12 Arguably, Washington policy makers could have done more to acknowledge the sour mood across the Atlantic, even when specific European criticisms seemed peevish and sanctimonious.

8. For a characteristic expression of that approach, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

Nevertheless, no dispensation of soothing syrup can cure the ills of the Atlantic alliance without a rededication to shared values. The World War II generation has left the political stage. Younger Europeans possess no personal recollections of how an earlier cohort of American democratic idealists helped to reconstruct their societies and economies. They have no instinctive feelings of transatlantic solidarity. On a number of mutually reinforcing grounds, therefore, American and West European security interests may well diverge further, at the very least outside Europe. And that divergence carries risks at least as grave for Europe as for America. Marc Trachtenberg puts the case with monitory clarity: If France and Germany expect the United States to guarantee their security while continuing the hostile policies that they pursued in the Iraq imbroglio, they are, in the formulation of longtime New York Times columnist James Reston, “asking and expecting things that have never been and will never be.”13

II

Economic and financial conflicts among Western countries do not lend themselves to such melodramatic treatment. Economic divergencies wax and wane within the Western alliance. They have neither caused the present misunderstanding, nor are they likely to contribute to divorce. In this case, past is prologue. Observers of secular fluctuations in the international economy over the course of the business cycle do well to keep in mind the dramatist Nestroy’s salient observation: “The chief characteristic of progress is that it appears to be greater than it really is.”14

In the long run, transformation of the world economy proves at least as powerful an engine of change as vicissitudes in the fortune of alliances. Yet economic change takes place on a slower and not wholly coordinated timetable. The relationship between economic predominance and political influence is complicated. Generalization proves

hazardous, and often misleading. Douglas Hurd, the forceful British foreign secretary of the early 1990s, liked to say that through skilled diplomacy his nation could “punch above its weight” in international affairs.\(^\text{15}\) Hurd conflated analysis with nostalgia, perhaps, yet surely governments with clear goals and a well-oiled bureaucracy operate more effectively in the foreign policy arena than regimes without those advantages. On the other hand, over the course of several generations comparative economic performance inevitably determines the pecking order in the international hierarchy.

Some members of the professoriat contend that the system of nation-states which has structured international relations since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia is drawing to a close. Practitioners reply, to adapt Mark Twain’s aphorism, that reports of its death are exaggerated. In any event, past experience suggests that, without the presence of other factors, competition for resources does not necessarily lead to open hostilities under the Westphalian system. Conversely, a cooperative economic regime provides no more than a fragile barrier against the passions of ideology or religion. The bloody history of the twentieth century illustrates those precepts well. In 1910 the British political publicist Sir Norman Angell asserted that advanced industrial nations could no longer afford to engage in war against each other. The cost of modern armaments had become so great, he argued, that the civilized European powers would have to find a way to accommodate economic and imperial rivalries through peaceful means.\(^\text{16}\) Many internationally minded people agreed with Angell. The wish became father to the thought. Angell proved nonetheless an imperfect prophet. Not only did war break out among the major powers in 1914, but the cost of armaments and trade disruption constituted no bar to the opening of hostilities.\(^\text{17}\)

Still, men under the sway of theocratic doctrine do not easily change their minds. Like French aristocrats under the Restoration king Charles X,


17. David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904–1914. Stevenson points out, moreover, that before 1914 none of the great powers spent anywhere near as large a fraction of gross national product on armaments as became normative by the late 1930s.

Angell and his fellow utopians neither learned anything nor forgot anything as a result of the Great War. They placed their trust during the postwar era in efforts by the League of Nations to restore economic and financial harmony. The League, they hoped, could relieve the competition for raw materials, markets, and population outlets to which they attributed much international conflict.\(^\text{18}\) International bank cooperation would complete the virtuous circle.\(^\text{19}\)

Hardly any of those collaborative endeavors survived the Great Depression intact. None could prevent a sharp reversal of the globalization that had knit the international economy together before World War I.\(^\text{20}\) All the same, the breakdown of economic cooperation had at most a marginal indirect effect on the second gathering storm. Few would contend in retrospect that Germany went to war in 1939 owing primarily to a need for Lebensraum or markets. Nor do most historians credit the theory that Japan could have solved its economic problems in the 1930s in no other way than by creating a so-called Co-Prosperity Sphere resting on brutal exploitation. Only a scattering of revisionists would maintain nowadays that economic rivalry determined the course of the Cold War between 1945 and 1990.

These observations do not require adherence to any theoretical model. Both ideology and a struggle for resources help explain interstate conflict at various times in the past. For example, religious conviction largely motivated the medieval European crusaders against Islam. Religion inspired the Protestant and Catholic participants in the wars of the German Reformation. In contrast, countries along the Atlantic littoral came to blows in the sixteenth century over the silver and gold resources of Mexico and Peru. Britain and France squabbled ceaselessly in the eighteenth century over the riches of the West Indies.


and the profits of worldwide empire. In the twentieth century, by contrast, no comparable example comes to mind. Major conflicts, it seems clear, turned on national rivalries, racial antipathies, ideological divergencies, or on some admixture of the three. In the current era, if past is prologue, religion and culture may again form the basis for a clash of civilizations.21 To sum up, in modern times economic strength frequently provides the margin of victory, but it does not explain why one side or the other lets loose the dogs of war. The cautious observer will neither underestimate, nor overestimate, the web of economic and financial institutions that has increasingly bound the developed world together since 1945.

III

Increasing globalization before 1914 and again since 1950 has required all developed capitalist states to face common problems. Before World War II, however, they faced them more often within a competitive than a collaborative framework. Since 1945, the institutional scaffolding for collaboration has become progressively more elaborate. The transient disputes that erupt from time to time—for example, the failure of the Doha Round of trade liberalization, or the retaliatory sanctions that the United States and the European Union episodically impose upon each other—may well appear in retrospect as mere squeaks from the wheel of globalization. Parochial domestic interests always remain powerful in a world of nation-states. Yet the Western powers and those striving to join the West seem well on their way—through such institutions as the IMF, the World Bank, the GATT, the OECD, NAFTA, the G-8 meetings, and the still evolving European Union—to creating a liberal international economic order based on agreed codes of behavior.22 Without falling victim to a Whig view of history, we must account more for the relative success of the current free-market model than for its failures.


22. See Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods; John Gillingham, European Integration, 1950–2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?

To explain the startling success of the free-market model that originated in England and gradually spread to Continental Europe and English offshoots, one must go back to the Middle Ages. In the year 1000 Western Europe could boast living standards no higher than those of the outside world. Indeed, since the fall of Rome, China, Japan, and the Arab civilizations of the southern Mediterranean littoral had surpassed the West in technology and some aspects of material culture. As Figures 1 and 2 indicate, combined gross domestic product grew three hundred-fold and per capita income thirteen-fold over the next millennium, but the locus of growth reversed. By 1820 the West (conventionally defined as the thirteen Western and Northern European countries and the four leading British offshoots) had attained per capita income twice that of the rest of the world. From the late eighteenth century to the last quarter of the twentieth, the curve measuring progress turned upward again. The West further differentiated itself from the rest of mankind in technological sophistication, health and life expectancy, social welfare, and other indices of economic performance.23 By 2000 the per capita income gap between the West and the rest had increased to seven times.

This advance in human well-being arguably rates as the greatest achievement in the history of mankind. The United States and the richest European countries (as well as Japan and Singapore) currently enjoy average incomes twenty to thirty times greater than those of sub-Saharan Africa. It is nonetheless deemed good breeding to play down that accomplishment. According to a recent president of the American Historical Association, "our children and our students know, in these days of multiculturalism and of postcolonial studies, that Europe—that funny little peninsula jutting off the edge of Asia—is not the center of history."24 Very possibly this distinguished scholar and the herd of independent minds who echo her analysis correctly perceive the contemporary sensibility. All the same, by objective standards the West has stood for the past several centuries as the unchallenged engine of global advance in every field, material and intellectual.

Conventional accounts ascribe this unparalleled growth of the West to the adoption of convertible husbandry and other innovative agricultural

23. For specific figures and an explanatory scheme, see Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1600–1913; The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, and The World Economy: Historical Statistics; also available at www.oecd.org.

Figure 1. The West and the Rest: Regional Growth Trends, 1000–1820

Figure 2. The West and the Rest: The Market Economy Differential, 1820–2001
techniques, the industrial and transportation revolutions, the willingness to invent or adopt new technology, and the settlement of fertile and relatively empty parts of the globe. Last, but not least, the liberalization of capital and labor markets allowed each nation to specialize according to the dictates of comparative advantage. All those factors formed part of a feedback process influencing the others. Fundamentally, however, the spectacular “take-off” of the West, to employ Walt Rostow’s phrase, figured as an artifact of Western culture and Western political institutions.

“Culture” embraces far more than high culture, although roughly 80 percent of the world’s chief intellectual and artistic accomplishments between 1400 and 1950 came from four countries or areas alone—England, France, Germany, and Italy. Rather, Western Europe and the English-speaking offshoots elsewhere were unique in developing free markets, security of property, a predictable system of law, and parliamentary limitations on the exercise of arbitrary power.

Western Europe in the seventeenth century experienced a scientific revolution that not merely discredited traditional authority, but also gave leaders in every field—from soil chemistry to political theory—the sense that they could master nature and improve on the wisdom of the ancients. Europeans stood prepared to borrow the technological innovations of other cultures and, whether they embraced the “Protestant ethic” or its Catholic variant, were not held back, as were Muslim lands, by a religion essentially hostile to scientific speculation. The turn toward less arbitrary government, particularly in England, fostered legal predictability, and Englishmen learned to deal with each other on the basis of agreement and contract rather than force and hierarchy. Industrialization lay at the heart of a broader process of modernization and urbanization, in which citizens learned to tolerate economic dislocation, that is to say, what Joseph Schumpeter would categorize euphemistically as the process of “creative destruction.” Western cultures proved extraordinarily resourceful in permitting Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” to clear markets. Meanwhile, the “visible hand” of modern management facilitated continual, efficient redesign of the scale and scope of the individual firm.

The inherent dynamism of modern capitalism has sustained an ongoing industrial revolution. Upward progress has mostly come gradually, through a pattern of stimulus and response in specific industrial sectors. Yet every generation or so a technological breakthrough leads to fundamental restructuring of the economy. Perhaps the upward arc might better be described as punctuated equilibrium than as revolution. Over time, new industries at the beginning of their product cycles proved transformative. Thus the textile, railroad, and engineering sectors supplied the impetus for growth in the early nineteenth century. Organic chemicals, electrical goods, and the internal combustion engine followed in the late nineteenth century. Consumer durables took the lead in the interwar years. And in our own day, information technology has effected a metamorphosis in the way firms do business.

Up through the mid-twentieth century, only West European societies and their English-speaking offshoots mustered the stability to tolerate the strains inherent in such dynamism without unremitting social and cultural upheaval. Argentina stood as the single apparent exception: it outpaced Germany and fell just behind France in per capita income as late as 1929. Thereafter, however, Argentina fell prey to populist misrule and sank to East European levels. Argentina’s failure seemed

25. For the origins of this idea, which remains as apposite today as in the early nineteenth century, see David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.
31. For the statistics, see Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, Tables 1c, 3b-c, 4c. For analysis of Argentina’s self-inflicted wounds, see Luis Alberto Romero, A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century; for the regional context, Pedro Aspe Armella, Rudiger Dornbusch, and Maurice Obstfeld, eds., Financial Policies and World Capital Markets: The Problem of Latin American Countries; and Eul-Soo Pang, The International Political Economy of Transformation in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile since 1960.
to underscore the difficulties of cultural transmission from the Western core to other parts of the world. Then a startling change occurred. After 1950 Japan and other East Asian societies began to master the techniques of modernization, embracing the technology though not fully the ambient culture of the West. Figure 3 shows that substantial convergence has already taken place, with Singapore—the freest East Asian economy—surpassing France and Germany in the per capita income ratings. And China, although starting from a depressed level, has consistently registered a growth rate approaching 10 percent in recent years. The traditional Western countries—the United States as well as those in the European Union—face an unprecedented challenge.

Whatever the case in the early modern period, the superior economic performance of West European and offshoot societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries came only in small part from the expropriation of extra-European wealth. The facts do not sustain the claims of Hobson, Hilferding, Lenin, and their socialist compatriots that European wealth derived importantly from markets and investment opportunities in the Third World. Nor did imperialism conjure up an extra-European

32. Silver and gold inflows from Mexico and Peru, and profits derived from the West Indian sugar trade, require a different interpretation of capital formation in pre-modern Europe.


35. Charles Lipson, *Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. 

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proletariat to exploit. Almost everywhere, imperialism proved a losing proposition for advanced industrial powers, justifiable to taxpayers only on security grounds. The British directed 70 percent of their foreign investment to the United States and other developed countries, 20 percent to India, and no more than 10 percent to other backward areas. The allegation of underdevelopment theorists that British investors used their competitive advantage for direct investment overseas, thus distorting colonial economies, also turns out to lack foundation. Before 1914, the British (just like the French and Germans) devoted 70 percent of their overseas investment to railroads, roads, ports, and other infrastructure; they placed less than 10 percent in mining and agriculture. The transfer of European managerial skills and technology had more durable consequences than the export of capital. What’s more, gunboat diplomacy did not usually intimidate Third World borrowers into paying their debts. One generation after another of colonial borrowers managed to default and, after a brief hiatus, to regain access to capital markets in the métropole.

Despite the profitless nature of imperialism over all, the international economy was highly politicized during the nineteenth century, just as it remains today. Some 40 percent of British exports were invisibles before 1914. As the British fell behind the Americans and Germans in technological prowess and managerial expertise, they compensated by centering trade finance, insurance, and shipping in the City of London. Scholars now acknowledge that the gold standard alone failed to provide the flawless mechanism for the automatic adjustment of international accounts that it was supposed to furnish before World War I. The visible hand of the London City actually coordinated the international economy. Under other circumstances, some other standard might conceivably have replaced gold as the primary medium of exchange. In fact, the French government advocated a European monetary union.
based on a bimetallic standard in the 1860s. Although the British and Prussians vetoed the scheme, the British to defend the financial interests of the London City, the Prussians on narrowly political grounds, the general idea seemed less outlandish once deflation became an endemic problem in the mid-1870s. Deflation in turn undermined the doctrine of free trade, and the adoption of protective tariffs by Britain's chief competitors underscored the frenetic economic nationalism of the pre-1914 era.

All the same, globalization under Western aegis continued to gather momentum until a type of thirty years' civil war broke out within the West in 1914. The process of globalization, whether measured by trade, capital, or labor flows, came to an abrupt stop. Economists are wont to blame a misguided attempt to restore the gold-exchange standard for the failure of Europe to recover from World War I and for the slide into the Great Depression. They claim that the return to gold at a point when precious metal production failed to keep pace with the volume of trade imparted a deflationary bias to the international economy. Adherence to gold also transmitted shocks from one country to another. However, the proponents of central bank cooperation could have devised a technical fix for the purported gold shortage through the instrumentality of special drawing rights. At bottom, monetary arrangements represent an implicitly bargaining framework for organizing international economic relations. They may work more or less smoothly through the course of the business cycle. But when they break down altogether, they do so for political reasons. The international economy collapsed in the 1930s because the leading nations of the Western world could not settle their domestic distributive controversies and foreign political conflicts.

Many phenomena came together to reinforce the downward spiral. The rise of labor union power made it impossible for nations with a misaligned currency to reduce nominal wages. The government of Weimar Germany stood ready to risk systemic collapse in order to rid itself of reparations. Perhaps most important, the war had left international finance without an obvious hegemon. In Charles Kindleberger's formulation, Great Britain no longer possessed the financial strength to serve as a buyer of distress goods, a counter-cyclical lender, and a discounter in a crisis. The United States felt no compulsion to act as a global stabilizer proportional to its economic means. Aside from their lingering disinclination to act outside the Western Hemisphere and their modest participation in international trade, Americans had not yet developed the financial institutions necessary to play that role.

The Americans who largely conceived and imposed a better-grounded financial architecture in 1944–1946 resolved to avoid the mistakes of their interwar predecessors. Yet the Bretton Woods arrangements also reflected the discrete interests of the United States. By 1945 the United States had piled up two-thirds of world gold in Fort Knox and amassed almost half the planet's undestroyed manufacturing capacity. Inevitably, the Bretton Woods system remained an American-centered system based on the use of the dollar as the sole reserve currency. The authorities in Washington liked to picture their country as a beneficent hegemon, but a hegemon nonetheless. They provided Western Europe with bountiful financial help in the decade after the war, but invariably on American terms. Privately, the Europeans—the British and French perhaps more than the Germans and Italians—resented it. Here official public memory departs from gritty reality. For example, State


38. Harold James, *The End of Globalization*.


40. Both Randolph Burgess, an economist attached to the 1929 Young Committee, and Per Jacobsson, chief economist at the Bank for International Settlements, crafted plausible schemes.


Department planners had schemed since the 1930s to break down the Ottawa system of Imperial preferences and to impose the Open Door on the British Dominions. They ratcheted up the pressure in the 1946 stabilization loan to Britain and, despite tenacious resistance, over the medium term succeeded.\footnote{Benjamin M. Rowland, Commercial Conflict and Foreign Policy: A Study in Anglo-American Relations, 1932–1938; Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective: The Origins and Prospects of Our International Economic Order; L. S. Pressnell, External Economic Policy since the War: The Post-War Financial Settlement.} And while the Marshall Plan has entered celebratory lore as a model of generosity, the Economic Cooperation Administration employed its leverage under the plan to force the pace of European integration.\footnote{Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952.}

Paradoxically, World War II discredited those conservative European forces naturally sympathetic to the dynamic style of American free enterprise. In every Continental country, the extreme left dominated the wartime Resistance. According to the mythology of Socialists as well as Communists, big business had sold out to “fascism” before the war and collaborated with the Nazis during the hostilities on grounds of self-interest.\footnote{See, for example, Richard Vinen, The Politics of French Business: 1936–1945.} Apprehensive of rough justice during the postwar purges, the scattered supporters of a market economy had to hide beneath the cassocks of Christian Democracy in order to remain politically viable.\footnote{Henry Turner has shown that, even in Germany, big businessmen, with some exceptions, nurtured grave reservations about Hitler from the start: German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler. Nevertheless, during World War II, most educated Germans gained the opposite impression from the work of the underground Communist, Fritz L. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism.}

In England, meanwhile, Prime Minister Churchill had focused on military issues after 1940 and abandoned the key domestic ministries to his Labour coalition partners.\footnote{Peter Novick, The Resistance versus Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France; Marc Olivier Baruch, ed., Une Poignée de misérables: l’épuration de la société française après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale.}

Allied victory therefore brought to power in Britain, France, Benelux, Scandinavia, and elsewhere elements that favored central planning, nationalization of key industries, permanent controls over other aspects of economic life, and the diversion of resources from capital investment to the elaboration of a welfare state. Many of those sympathizers with prewar Popular Front values stood well to the left of the American New Deal. Characteristically, they relied on a cohort of young economists who took their inspiration from John Maynard Keynes.\footnote{For the growing prestige of Keynesian thought among economists on both sides of the Atlantic, see Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes, Volume 3, Fighting for Freedom, 1937–1946; and Robert M. Collins, The Business Response to Keynes, 1929–1964. Alice Acurrucross and Nita Watts, The Economic Section, 1939–1961, show how uncritically even the best British government economists followed the holy grail of “planning.”} Whether they originally meant to do so or not, left-wing governments promoted social stability by spreading the benefits of economic security and prosperity. Societies with diminished class conflict, an egalitarian income distribution, and access to secondary education for the masses proved resistant to the blandishments of Russian-style communism. Within a single generation, the working classes of Western Europe came to enjoy the multiple pleasures of the consumer society.\footnote{Critics tend to deprecate the embourgeoisement of the West European working class as a species of Americanization. See, for example, Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: American Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe.}

On the other hand, a cradle-to-grave layering of health and welfare supports, social insurance, and bountiful pensions required crippling taxation and tended to crowd out private capital investment. Carried to excess, such policies were likely over time to hobble private-sector expansion and foster structural unemployment. These dangers did not become immediately apparent owing to the extraordinary rate of economic growth in Atlantic Community nations during the generation after the end of the war. That unprecedented era of prosperity sprang from a fortunate concatenation of circumstances. These included a backlog of readily applicable technology and the eagerness of business to innovate in the late 1940s, sound monetary policies and rapid advances in productivity during the 1950s, and unusually low energy and raw material prices that improved the terms of trade during the 1960s. In an era of neo-Keynesian self-confidence, however, advocates of the welfare state preferred to discern a “politics of productivity” in which sustained public spending and income redistribution had conjured up a virtuous circle of high aggregate demand.\footnote{Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War.}
These disputes took place between the Left and the Right within each Western society, of course. Yet even Europeans who counted as friends of the United States began to speak, somewhat simplistically, of a basic divergence in values. "Western Europe was a vacuum, on either side of which were the two great dynamic forces of communism and American capitalism," proclaimed the French planner Jean Monnet in 1949. "This vacuum could be filled either by one of these outside forces or by the development of a Western European 'way of life.'" Monnet conceived that third way on the model of the British Labour government, which had "carried out a redistribution of wealth on a massive scale while at the same time retaining the freedom of the individual."53

The defeated countries, Germany and Italy, resisted the blandishments of a cradle-to-grave safety net somewhat better than the putative victors during the recovery years immediately after the war. As Mancur Olson has pointed out, the weakening of such intermediate bodies as employers' associations, labor unions, and consumer advocacy groups eased economic bottlenecks to the free flow of capital and labor.54 In Germany, through the early 1960s, so long as Ludwig Erhard headed the Economics Ministry, the Federal Republic promoted a type of pro-growth model denominated Rhineland capitalism or the Social Market economy. In theory capital and labor were supposed to collaborate through a process of codetermination that both sides, and consumers as well, would find equitable.55

Figure 3 shows that defeated Germany closed the income gap with France during the 1950s. Nonetheless, in the final analysis, neither the cartelized heavy industries nor the Marxian Socialist labor unions of West Germany sincerely accepted the idea of a market economy encompassing an element of risk. Some German businessmen began to emulate the American entrepreneurial model, and AFL emissaries did what they could to influence forward-looking German unionists in a Social-Democratic direction.56 Yet only a minority of middle-class Germans (many of them enrolled in the small Free Democratic Party) embraced Erhard's Ordo-Liberalism wholeheartedly. By the time the un Reconstruction Socialist Willy Brandt became chancellor in 1969, Germany began to resemble other slow-growth, leisure-oriented European wel fare states.57 With mixed-economy enthusiasts having prevailed almost everywhere, the 1970s figured as the high noon of "Eurosclerosis"—a progressive condition in which an aggregation of controls and regulations clogs the vital arteries of the economy. A spike in energy prices after 1973 and a reversal in the terms of trade between industrial exporters and commodity producers obscured the depth of the problem at first. Eventually it became clear that a culture of leisure and private satisfactions, overregulation of business, guaranteed employment and uncompetitive wages, short working hours and commodious welfare benefits resulted in a slowdown of economic growth.58 Still, many actors in the political process, particularly under Socialist governments, considered the trade-off preferable to the supposedly unrestrained capitalism on the other side of the Atlantic.

IV

Meanwhile, the United States began in the 1960s to use its seigniorage over the world monetary system for unilateral advantage. Here again, defense of the West in the Cold War did not mean that the pecuniary interests of the Allied nations coincided. Coordination of security policies proves perfectly compatible with aggressive rivalry in the economic sphere. Under Bretton Woods rules, foreign central banks held dollars as the principal reserve against their own currency issue. The system worked smoothly so long as the United States dominated global industrial production and other countries experienced a dollar shortage, as they generally did up to the mid-1950s. Yet the Bretton Woods regime institutionalized no systemic check on American monetary expansion once the United States began, at the beginning of the 1960s, to run a chronic balance-of-payments deficit. Foreign central banks could either monetize their excess dollars at the risk of domestic inflation or sterilize

58. See, among other works, the essays in David Calleo and Claudia Morgenstern, eds., Recasting Europe's Economies: National Strategies in the 1980s.
them; in either case they would effectively have to write Washington a blank check. As Jacques Rueff and other advisers to President de Gaulle of France complained, the United States could meet its foreign requirements by inflating the monetary base of its trade partners.59

In 1961 the Kennedy administration sought to spur economic growth at home through a supply-side tax cut. Officials offered the justification that they would still aim at a “full employment balanced budget.” In practice this decision, taken when labor markets (except for the structurally unemployed) were already reasonably tight, imparted an inflationary bias to the economy. The federal government would run mounting deficits for the next generation. Imbued with a sense of invincibility verging on hubris, the Kennedy team sought to maintain the Pax Americana through overseas military outlays, generous foreign aid, and capital investment by U.S. multinationals, even though export revenues no longer covered those expenditures in full. Viewing the difficulty as temporary at first, the administration pressured Germany and Japan to contribute a larger share of the upkeep for U.S. troops overseas. Unfortunately, the problem turned out not to be temporary. Ever since World War II, the United States had enjoyed lower capital costs and higher labor productivity than its trade partners. Those advantages had eroded, although the broad public remained unaware how far the deterioration had gone.60

When the succeeding Johnson administration (1963–1969) attempted to finance Great Society social programs and an unpopular war in Vietnam without raising taxes, inflationary expectations exploded. Real wage increases exceeding productivity gains became embedded in the American economy, just as they did in West European economies at about the same time. The Kennedy Round of trade liberalization, which officials had hoped would improve the basic balance, exposed a structural deficit instead. Moreover, Great Society legislation fostered changes in behavior among workers and businessmen that engendered stagflation. When Richard Nixon, the Republican victor in the 1968 election, tried to curb the twin budget and trade deficits, a deep recession ensued. After badly losing the midterm elections, Nixon sharply reversed course. He concluded that traditional sound-money policies had become politically infeasible.61

Nixon’s “New Economic Policy” of 1971 ended convertibility of the dollar into gold. The president’s fresh counselors realized that to jettison Bretton Woods at a stroke might disrupt trade relations and encourage the avarice of Third World raw-material producers. But they held it politically suicidal to pursue a restricted-growth policy at home for balance-of-payments reasons. They resolved to force some form of dollar devaluation and to redistribute defense burdens within the Western alliance. The era in which the United States could afford unilateral concessions to its partners closed. A White House adviser spoke of dispelling any “Marshall Plan psychology” that remained.62

However, Nixon’s gamble did not pay off. The breathing space that he secured proved insufficient to restructure the domestic economy for more productivity and less inflation. A variant of Eurosclerosis emerged on the Western side of the Atlantic. The social service bureaucracies that Nixon had inherited from his Great Society predecessors constituted an effective lobby for ever-increasing entitlement spending. The “silent majority” outside the Beltway may not have favored lavish outlays to end poverty by government fiat, but Congress took its cue from the opinion makers who did.63 In 1973–1974, moreover, oil producers and other raw-material suppliers jacked up prices and triggered deterioration in the terms of trade for all industrial countries. By this time, the Americans had induced their monetary partners to give up fixed exchange rates altogether, a development that free-market economists such as Milton Friedman had conveniently made intellectually respectable. During the


60. Unionized workers in basic industries such as autos and steel had negotiated gold-plated contracts during an era when foreign firms could offer little competition. When European productivity recovered and East Asian skill levels rose, U.S. union leaders tenaciously defended their gains. Nelson Lichtenstein explains this process well in The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor.


62. Peter G. Peterson, later head of Lehman-Kuhn Loeb, coined this winking phrase in his candid state paper, The United States in a Changing World Economy.

63. Samuel P. Huntington theorizes in Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity, 324–26, that the United States has become an “unrepresentative democracy” in which the judiciary, public interest groups, the mass media, Hollywood, radical Protestant churches, and academics enjoy more clout than the voters at large.
balance of the 1970s, the resourceful U.S. Treasury discovered ways to take advantage of floating rates.

As interwar experience demonstrated, floating rates have always proved subject to political manipulation. Government economists prefer to talk in genteel tones about “leaning against the wind harder than the wind is blowing,” but the effect is much the same. During the Carter administration, Treasury officials made strenuous efforts to “talk the dollar down” in the hope of boosting domestic employment. They would, in this respect, provide a precedent for the George W. Bush Treasury in 2004–2006. In the 1970s, at least, the Europeans and Japanese found themselves obliged willy-nilly to tolerate those maneuvers. Oil prices were denominated in dollars. This happy circumstance provided the United States with leverage. Other industrial nations realized that, if the dollar were held below purchasing-power parity, the artificial exchange rate would diminish the price of their oil. When OPEC ratcheted up the oil price a second time in the late 1970s, Washington replied with another effective devaluation of the dollar.

Eventually the Western countries and their OPEC interlocutors reached a standoff. The Arab nations possessed sufficient port facilities to import only a limited quantum of goods. They would have to place the rest of their excess profits in Western money-center banks for recycling to the Third World. Those banks often lent improvidently and suffered tremendous losses later in the 1980s. But that is another story, one outside the purview of American-European relations. This particular episode in beggar-thy-neighbor diplomacy did not come to an end until 1980. With the accession of Paul Volcker to the leadership of the Federal Reserve Board and the election of Ronald Reagan as president, anti-inflation forces at last secured the upper hand in Washington, at least temporarily. To sum up, the course of monetary affairs over the whole period, 1961 to 1981, exposed the severe domestic constraints limiting financial collaboration among Western countries that remained closely allied in the security sphere.

64. For this formulation, see Susan Howson, Sterling’s Managed Float: The Operation of the Exchange Equalization Account, 1932–39, 56.
65. For details, see Stephen A. Schuker, American “Reparations” to Germany, 1919–33, 120–47.
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and President Reagan in the United States, contrasted with the dismal failure of Pierre Mauroy’s Popular Front regime in France during 1981–1982, led the EC bureaucracy to reconsider business liberalization. EC Commission President Jacques Delors, although heretofore a strict votary of the Socialist line in Paris, began to soft-pedal industrial policy. He allowed Leon Brittan, the Thatcherite head of the EC Competition Directorate, to curb restrictive business practices and to enforce competition within a number of key economic sectors.

Over the next decade the Community shifted its primary emphasis from promoting MITI-like industrial champions through state-subsidized research to neutral rule-making for the marketplace. In several crucial areas, it permitted the engine of private competition to drive growth from the bottom up. Corporatist and protectionist lobbies in the individual countries deprecated the new orientation, but for the moment they did not prevail. EU member states memorialized their intention to deepen the union with a 1992 decision to create a European central bank and common currency by the end of the millennium. Professional economists fretted over the Maastricht plan as technically hazardous without concomitant budgetary coordination. The politicians and the Brussels bureaucrats replied that EU countries (with the exception of Great Britain and the Scandinavian outliers) wished to set down a political marker. The euro would confirm their resolve to accept limitations on national sovereignty in a greater cause.68

It looked at first as if the politicians had the better of the argument. The launch of the euro took place on schedule. Its value leaped to a premium as central banks around the globe sought to diversify their hard-currency holdings out of dollars. By 2005, however, it appeared that the economists had a point after all. France, Germany, and Italy, rather than setting an example, all thumbed their noses at the Growth and Stability Pact, which was supposed to limit the maximum fiscal deficit that EU members can run under common currency rules. Italy faced a particular dilemma because its small-scale, labor-intensive firms were steadily losing world market share at the prevailing exchange rate. All the same, the ultimate fate of the Maastricht vision for United Europe must turn on reasonable adherence to the currency rules.69 The solution of this conundrum lies in the future.

On balance the American government favored a stronger and deeper European Union. A United Europe need not conflict with American interests. Indeed, most U.S. specialists on Europe perceived clear advantage in having an enlarged “Western” economic sphere within which rule-based competition would prevail. In addition, a second plausible reserve currency would take pressure off the dollar. Unfortunately, the ambitious plans of the early 1990s for a liberalized EU have not worked out—at least not so far. The fresh approach of the Thatcherites has faded from institutional memory. The Brussels bureaucracy continues to crank out a myriad of regulations to govern the EU from the top down. The familiar special interests defend their turf, particularly in France and Germany, of necessity the locomotive countries in the Union.70

Outside limited fields of telecom, the high-tech boom of the past decade has failed to create firms with the scale and scope of their American and East Asian counterparts. European companies in the manufacturing and retail sectors have lagged the foreign competition in adapting information and communication technology (ICT) to improve factor productivity. The anticipated cross-border cooperation in biotechnology and nanotechnology has likewise not materialized to date. The French began to drag their feet on ending the compartmentalization of capital markets once it appeared that others would benefit at their expense.

In a number of high-profile cases the antitrust team at Brussels headquarters has given the impression of scrutinizing merger proposals by American firms with disproportionate vigor. Under the impetus of Commissioner “Supermario” Monti at the Competition Directorate (1999–2004), the bureaucracy often chose to raise barriers rather than lower them. Monti’s successor, Neelie Kroes, arrived with a flare of trumpets and pleasing rhetoric, but has not changed fundamentals. The EU authorities have continued to tolerate member-state subsidies for Airbus (the European Aeronautic, Defense and Space Company) well beyond a semblance of fair transatlantic competition. They blocked a well-conceived merger between General Electric and Honeywell. And

68. Gillingham, European Integration, 149–302; Colette Mazzucelli, France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union.
70. David Calleo, ed., Europe’s Franco-German Engine.
they so far exceeded U.S. Justice Department requirements in forcing Microsoft to eliminate parts of its browser that, in early 2006, the American firm charged lack of due process.

Meanwhile, common agricultural policy—the CAP—continues to drain EU coffers to the detriment of more constructive uses of funds. The EU agriculture commissioner promises to slash trade-distorting farm subsidies by 70 percent before 2013, but sets a target date so far removed that it sounds suspiciously like the Greek Calends. EU countries have also erected an informal nontariff barrier against American agricultural products by spreading the impression, contrary to scientific evidence, that genetically modified foods are unsafe. In many respects, therefore, the EU has assumed a protectionist stance against the United States. In France, in accordance with a long tradition, the fear of American economic penetration has found particularly fertile soil. Characteristically, the president of the French National Library has mounted the barricades against the Web browser Google, warning of “the risk of a crushing domination by America in the definition of the idea that future generations will have of the world.”

In 2004, the fifteen existing members of the European Union took a giant step in widening the bloc. With great fanfare, they admitted ten developing nations from Eastern and Southern Europe, thus raising the economic Iron Curtain, a residue of the Cold War. On a number of sensitive points, however, the Brussels authorities had never fully resolved the debate whether to deepen or widen the union first. Hence they stipulated transition arrangements that restricted agricultural subsidies for seven years to old members. They likewise limited legal migration for seven years. And they denied the newcomers participation in the Schengen Agreement for eliminating border checks. Thus despite much cheery rhetoric, the prospect of a “two-speed Europe” hove into view. Many East Europeans had hoped for economic flexibility on the American model rather than a stockpile of ukases handed down from Brussels. A few voiced disillusionment with the terms on offer so far. Lamenting the barriers against Polish workers, Lech Wałęsa, founder of the Solidarity labor movement, wondered with pardonable exaggeration why the French for so many years “encouraged Poles to build capitalism when it turns out they are communists themselves.”

Meanwhile, the venerable Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and his coterie of Paris enarques took on the task of elaborating a constitution. The Giscard team hoped to freeze French supremacy in place as the union continued to evolve. At length a 474-page tome issued forth, replete with declarations, appendices, and protocols. Giscard evidently sought to revivify a powerful supranational bureaucracy with a strong French accent, somewhat along the lines proposed in the early 1950s by Jean Monnet. In March 2005 he warned President Jacques Chirac against holding a referendum to ratify this monstrosity: “It is not possible,” he remarked cynically, “for anyone to understand the full text.” Chirac decided that legally he had to seek public approval, and the French voters rejected the document decisively. Shortly afterward, Dutch voters also withheld their imprimatur, and the other countries quietly pigeonholed the document. By the autumn of 2006, no one could foretell what substitute would emerge or whether it too would reflect a hypertrophic statist orientation.

The present crisis of the European Union goes beyond the wording of its charter or the shape of its organization chart. Despite periodic excursions andalarums, the arrangement has usually worked tolerably well because it rested on a tacit Franco-German political understanding. Unwilling to

77. Some scholars display more optimism for a quick recovery of European institutions than does this writer. For a compendium of their views, see John Gillingham, Design for a New Europe.
accept a place in the European queue proportionate to its population and resources, France has always sought to harness German economic power to achieve Continental supremacy. From immodest wartime beginnings through the end of his second reign in 1969, Charles de Gaulle imagined that he could conjure up a third force to hold the balance between the two “barbarous” superpowers. His successors cling to the same idea, though they express it with greater discretion. From the Adenauer era onward, the Germans stood prepared to subsidize France’s farmers, pick up the tab for its empire, and lavish development funds on lesser EU members as they joined. By dispariting themselves as good Europeans, the leaders of the Bonn Republic aimed to efface the memory of Nazism and to regain political respectability. By one calculation, German taxpayers paid more to subsidize European integration than they had refused to pay in reparations after World War I. Other powers accepted German reunification in 1990 largely owing to this calculated generosity.

Yet all good things must come to an end. Germany, and to a lesser extent Great Britain, can no longer afford, by a prudent calculation of advantage, to play Santa Claus to other EU members. Many observers now think of Germany as “the sick man of Europe.” Figure 3 indicates that since reunification the German economy has performed even more dismally than the sluggish economy of France. Chancellor Helmut Kohl made a fundamental error in 1990 when he ignored advice from the Bundesbank and agreed to exchange the GDR mark for the deutsche mark at par. At a stroke, this politically deft but economically daft maneuver rendered all of East German industry unviable. German labor unions made things worse by insisting on a prompt equalization of wages in both parts of the reconfigured Bundesrepublik. The burdens of rebuilding infrastructure and subsidizing those rendered permanently unemployed in the East compounded the deeply embedded structural problems of the West German economy.

Nevertheless, the main political parties and pressure groups have tenaciously resisted change. When, after long cogitation, Gerhard Schröder, chancellor of the Red-Green coalition, proposed a modest cut in corporate taxation, he felt compelled to close “loopholes” so that the macroeconomic effect would be close to zero. Schröder’s Christian Democratic successor, Angela Merkel, has done little better. Although Merkel squeezed out a small plurality in the 2005 elections, she had to form a Great Coalition with her SPD opponents in order to secure a majority in the Bundestag. Bowing to the political realities, she soon passed the word, “‘Neoliberalism’ is out; ‘Social justice’ is in.” After ineffectual efforts to reform health care around the edges, Merkel turned to a familiar standby—higher indirect taxes.

By the time that the United States recovered from a modest business-cycle downturn in 2004–2005, it became evident that “Euroclerosis” was approaching crisis proportions in those EU countries adhering to the Franco-German welfare-state model. In 1998 Robert Mundell, intellectual father of the euro, had cautioned that monetary union alone would not solve the problem of underused resources and unemployment rates chronically exceeding 10 percent. Vexatious taxation of business, overregulation of labor and capital markets, and a social safety net that overshot the bounds of allocative efficiency, Mundell predicted, would exert a permanent drag on economic performance. Seven years later, the numbers had proved him right (see Figure 3). Since the mid-1990s the Continental states of “Old Europe” (Luxembourg excepted) have grown at roughly half the American rate, while the United States in turn has significantly lagged behind China and the East Asian “Tigers.” By contrast, those EU members that have grown satisfactorily (Ireland, the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, and to a lesser degree Great Britain)

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80. Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft; Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity; Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany.


82. The “sick man of Europe” is a play on historical memory. In the nineteenth century diplomats referred to the declining Ottoman Empire as “the sick man of Europe.”


have done so by creating a favorable climate for investment. They have slashed corporate taxation, increased tax transparency, curbed regulation, and eased restrictions on hiring and firing. 85

The temper of public opinion in Old Europe suggests that routine electoral change such as took place in Germany in 2005 will not provide the impetus for radical surgery on the welfare state. Not merely the political and intellectual elites, but also the mass of voters express a clear preference for keeping things as they are. Moreover, the leading Continental countries suffer from pervasive social and cultural ills that economic policy changes cannot solve in isolation.

The work ethic in Western Europe appears to have declined. 86 This applies particularly to the younger generation, even in Germany, where pride in work traditionally stood at the core of the culture. 87 It is hard to quantify a subjective quality such as the preference for leisure. George Weigel enters the realm of speculation when he connects the purported sybaritic orientation of young West Europeans to a loss of religious faith rather than to generational change. 88 About the numbers, however, little doubt obtains. Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank, points out that output per hour worked in the EU has almost converged with the U.S. level. Output per capita remains stuck, however, at two-thirds the U.S. level. Americans (and many East Asians) work on average close to two thousand hours a year, while the French and Germans work fewer than sixteen hundred hours. 89 Management consultants also discern some qualitative decline of entrepreneurial spirit among the younger cohort of the West European bourgeoisie. Significant

numbers of the rising generation express reluctance to take over small and medium-size businesses from their fathers. 90 Yet more problematic, the principal European countries seem mired in an immigration trap. Citizens eligible for long-term unemployment payments will not take menial jobs. What’s more, European populations are aging and not reproducing themselves. The total fertility rate in the years 1995–2000 was 1.73 in France, 1.70 in Great Britain, 1.33 in Germany, 1.20 in Italy, and 1.10 in Spain. Muslim populations across the Mediterranean have birthrates several times higher. 91 For the first time since Charles Martel repulsed the Islamic forces at the Battle of Tours in 732 A.D., North Africans have swarmed across the Pyrenees. Another stream of Muslim immigrants arrives in Germany from Turkey and the Balkans; still a third reaches England from the former British Empire.

Nativists mutter that the tectonic plates of Africa are sliding under Europe. This is, however, an alarmist claim that fails to capture the complexity of Islamic immigration. Relatively secular Turks, the middle-class progeny of Punjabi shopkeepers forced out of British East Africa, and peasants from the Algerian bled vary drastically in average skill levels and potential for assimilation. The French, who in the past have insisted that immigrants swallow their civic culture whole, face the most acute difficulties. Owing to the high birthrate among immigrants and their progeny, one-quarter of school-age children in France now have a parent or grandparent of non-European origin. Radicalized youths in the Muslim banlieues disdain the “Infidel” way of life. Young men, more so than their female counterparts, decline to cultivate the skills that would enable them to enter the work force in any capacity. Many liken assimilation to “cultural rape.” 92 In November 2005 riots swept the suburbs of Paris. In comparison, British Muslims have remained relatively quiescent. Still, when native-born suicide bombers blew up London trains and


86. In France, a paean to idleness on the job became a runaway bestseller in 2004: Corinne Maier, Bonjour paresse: de l’art et de la nécessité d’en faire le moins possible en entreprise. This slight effusion has no probative value as an index of workplace performance, but its stunning success casts light on the mentality of a certain book-buying public.

87. The work ethic used to form such an integral component of German working-class culture that even the National Socialist regime took care to foster it on the shop floor as a way to minimize opposition. See Lutz Niethammer, ed., Lebensgeschichte und Sozialkultur im Ruhrgebet: 1930 bis 1960.


90. I am indebted to Mark Fuller, chairman of Monitor Corporation, for this insight. In France, some critics also perceive growing obstacles to the circulation of elites at the very top of society. Reformers fear that entrance into the Ecole Nationale d’Administration, which trains virtually all the top political and business leaders, is becoming a quasi-hereditary perquisite, “like the mandarins of medieval China.” John Carreyou, “Is Elite School France’s Failing?” Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2006.


buses in July 2005, 24 percent of British Muslims admitted to sympathy with the “feelings and motives” of those who carried out the attacks. Over the following year, moreover, Scotland Yard foiled a dozen new conspiracies in various stages of preparation.

In the long run Europe requires young workers from abroad to fill out the domestic labor supply and to maintain the viability of pay-as-you-go retirement systems. But more immediately, the inflow of poorly educated and often unruly Muslims places a tremendous strain on social, medical, instructional, police, and carceral services. A vicious circle ensues. Middle-class Europeans must pay such high taxes to service the needs of the newcomers that they cannot afford to raise many children themselves. Still, the liberal elites of Western Europe accept the new immigration as a necessary, and largely ineluctable, consequence of globalization. President de Gaulle explained in 1959 that he had to cut Algeria loose because Muslims were unassimilable, and he could not stand to see his village, Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, turn into Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées. No politician to the left of Jean Le Pen’s National Front would dare to voice such sentiments today.

Do Western Europe’s social problems, serious as they are, imperil the vital interests of the United States? Probably they do not. The pattern of U.S. trade has evolved. America’s leading trade partners at present are Canada, Mexico, China, and Japan. The prospects for future growth in trade and investment loom largest in East and South Asia. The urban populations of China and India offer a scarcely tapped supply of well-educated and technologically skilled workers. The Bush administration has also boosted hemispheric trade by signing a Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). If it can persuade Congress and the ultranationalists of the Mercosur bloc to go along, it hopes eventually to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) as well. In Washington, economic and financial relations with EU nations have assumed a lower priority. In 2004–2006, for example, the U.S. Treasury, through so-called benign neglect, deliberately pushed the dollar down below purchasing-power parity against the euro and sterling. The EU, as a consequence, found its prospects for export-led growth diminished. The Treasury principally aimed by that maneuver to force China to revalue the renminbi—a task still incomplete. The ensuing difficulties for Europe rated as collateral damage, a second-order concern.

François Heisbourg, director of a leading Paris think tank, proclaims that there are already two “Wests,” with the Atlantic Community headed for divorce. This neo-Gaulist conceit overestimates France’s powers of attraction. The recent East European adherents to the EU look for their economic model, as well as for their security, principally to the United States. Great Britain has no greater incentive to abandon the “special relationship” than it did on the eve of the 1944 Normandy landings, when Winston Churchill peremptorily explained the facts of geopolitical life to Charles de Gaulle. The Berlin-Paris flirtation has cooled somewhat since the return of the German Christian Democrats to office. Chancellor Merkel has already proclaimed that “European integration and Atlantic partnership are not at odds.” The Western alliance, in economic as well as security terms, will somehow stumble along.

The United States and its European partners will continue their pattern of competitive cooperation in third countries, with the emphasis sometimes on competition and at other times on cooperation. Both areas will have to tack against the winds of globalization. Advances in digitization and telecommunications make it increasingly feasible for multinational corporations to shift both production and knowledge work to lands where they can find skilled labor at a competitive price. While the critics of globalization pretend that the process harms less-developed countries, the statistics on balance contradict that view.


94. An immense literature has developed on this subject, most of it sympathetic to the immigrants. Among recent works, see Michael Bonnies and Andrew Geddes, eds., Migration and the Welfare State in Contemporary Europe; Gabriel Poullion, L’Europe contemporaine: consolidation et ouverture; Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe; Paul A. Silverstein, Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation; Patrick R. Ireland, Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State; Gallya Lahav, Immigration and Politics in the New Europe; Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield, eds., Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective; Kitty Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race, and Exclusion in Southern Europe.

95. Conversation of March 5, 1959, in Alain Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, vol. 1, 52.

96. Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur) currently includes Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay, but Venezuela and other Latin states where radicals have come to power are queuing up to become full voting members.


99. For a learned but temperate recapitulation of antiglobalization views, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents.
With capital as well as labor accessible across borders, firms in China, India, the Asian Tigers, and Eastern Europe find many opportunities to seize market share from their counterparts in the industrial West. Currently, some 63,000 multinational corporations straddle the global marketplace, compared with a mere 3,000 in 1990. Those multinationals, along with their 821,000 subsidiaries, produce one-quarter of the world’s gross industrial product and account for 70 percent of international trade. Significantly, the First World’s share of those corporations is steadily declining. In 1962 American companies constituted 60 percent of the largest multinationals. That figure has shrunk to 36 percent. The United States, Japan, France, Germany, and Britain together still provide a home base for 80 percent of the top five hundred multinationals, yet more of them shift their headquarters to the Third World every year.100

In fact, the definition of “the West” is changing at warp speed.101 The Heritage Foundation’s 2006 Index of Economic Freedom ranks twenty countries as free. Several would not have been considered a part of the industrial West half a century ago. Hong Kong and Singapore lead the pack, Iceland rates fifth, Estonia seventh, Chile fourteenth, and Cyprus sixteenth. The United States has declined to a three-way tie for ninth, largely owing to its high marginal corporate tax rates and government intrusions into private accounting under the Sarbanes-Oxley law. Great Britain and its Dominions, Ireland, and the Scandinavian states still count as free, but among the Continental nations in the old EU fifteen, only Luxembourg ranks high. The Netherlands, Austria, and Germany barely nudge over the free-state line. Among the old European Union fifteen, six have sunk into the “mostly free” category. France shows up in forty-fourth place, still ahead of the Cape Verde Islands and Uruguay, but below Armenia, Latvia, and Trinidad and Tobago.102 In the twenty-first century, “the West” is rapidly becoming a state of mind rather than a geographical location.

Is There Still a West?
The Future of the Atlantic Alliance

Edited by
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In memory of Robert Strausz-Hupé, scholar, diplomat, and man of the West